Informed institutional shareholding : evidence from political promotion by ZHANG, Chi
Lingnan University 
Digital Commons @ Lingnan University 
Theses & Dissertations Department of Finance and Insurance 
9-26-2017 
Informed institutional shareholding : evidence from political 
promotion 
Chi ZHANG 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.ln.edu.hk/fin_etd 
 Part of the Finance and Financial Management Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Zhang, C. (2017). Informed institutional shareholding: Evidence from political promotion (Master's thesis, 
Lingnan University, Hong Kong). Retrieved from http://commons.ln.edu.hk/fin_etd/17/ 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of Finance and Insurance at Digital 
Commons @ Lingnan University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses & Dissertations by an authorized 
administrator of Digital Commons @ Lingnan University. 
Terms of Use 
 
The copyright of this thesis is owned by its 
author. Any reproduction, adaptation, 
distribution or dissemination of this thesis 
without express authorization is strictly 
prohibited.  
 
All rights reserved. 
INFORMED INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDING:                
EVIDENCE FROM POLITICAL PROMOTION  
ZHANG CHI  
MPHIL 
LINGNAN UNIVERSITY  
2017  
 INFORMED INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDING:                
EVIDENCE FROM POLITICAL PROMOTION  
by  
ZHANG Chi 
張弛  
A thesis  
submitted in partial fulfillment  
of the requirements for the Degree of  
Master of Philosophy in Business  
Lingnan University  
2017 
ABSTRACT 
Informed Institutional Shareholding: Evidence from Political Promotion  
by  
ZHANG Chi  
Master of Philosophy  
Are institutional investors informed to the political promotion events? This paper 
examines the informed trading of institutional investors in the context of political 
promotion. Institutional investors have superior information environment compared to 
retail investors. It can establish private information channel with firm management, 
financial analysts, regulatory bodies and other types of institutions. Since 
contemporary economic activities are more or less influenced by politics, promotion 
of important officials can bring favorable local economic development opportunities 
to companies. If institutional investors are informed to the political promotion events, 
they are supposed to react in advance of the occurrence of promotion events. We test 
this proposition in the setting of China where political power is believed to be strong. 
In our research, we treat the promotion of Chinese provincial politicians as a private 
signal to institutional investors to examine their trading pattern. Through a difference-
in-difference approach, we find that institutional investors accelerate their purchase of 
shares of the firms exposed to the promotion events before the promotion activities 
actually happens and increase their shareholding in listed firms after the promotion 
events. The institutional investors earn a higher cumulative stock return by adjusting 
their portfolio to the promotion events. We also find this difference in institutional 
shareholding primarily occurs to firms with low state-own share percentage.  
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Informed Institutional Shareholding: Evidence from Political Promotion  
Chapter 1 Introduction 
Are institutional investors informed? This question has invited intensive debate in the 
public and the academia for a long time. A series of literature have documented 
institutions’ informed trading. Badrinath et al. (1995) show that returns of stocks are 
positively related to institutional ownership. Institutional trading can be used to predict 
stock returns at the firm, industry and market levels (Boulatov et al. (2013)). 
Hendershott et al. (2015) use daily institutional buy and sell data and find that 
institutional trading predicts news announcements, sentiment of news, returns on 
announcement day and earnings announcement surprises. In contrast, other studies 
provide evidence that institutions are not informed. The finding of Griffin et al. (2012) 
is institutions are reluctant to use inside information from investment bank clients. 
Busse et al. (2012) show that institutional investors are unable to evaluate the accuracy 
of financial analyst's recommendations in a way better than other investors. One 
possible explanation of the conflicting empirical evidence is most prior literature did 
not distinguish the specific context that institutional investors take advantage of when 
they are forming trading strategies. A very few papers, e.g. Li (2011), have shown 
evidence that institutional investors use non-public information to trade before M&A 
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announcements. However, we are still far from a complete picture on whether 
institutional investors are informed in trading; if they are, what types of information 
they use and through what channels they acquire information.  
In this paper, we examine the question in the context of political promotion. 
Specifically, we study whether institutional investors trade on private information 
about political promotion events before it is publicly known to the market. In this paper, 
political promotion refers to the process that a local government leader gets a position 
in the central government. It is a notable event containing news that can be used by 
institutional investors to benefit their trading. The appointment announcements of 
these officials will be captured by the public and they are important events for local 
society. It usually stands for change of regulations and policies which can affect 
company’s operation. It can also be a signal of the past conducts or achievements of 
the politician in the local region. In either case, if institutional investors have access to 
such information prior to the public, they are expected to adjust their shareholding and 
benefit from informed trading. 
Political turnovers take place every several years for a region, yet not always for 
promotions. Even though the promotion of a bureaucrat might be partly attributed to 
his economic achievements, it is mainly based on political consideration. Shih et al. 
(2012) argues that personal background such as education level, working experience 
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and social ties to national leaders play a more important role in promotion decisions 
than regional economic development. General public including mutual funds 
managers does not have the ability to influence the central government's determination 
of official appointments. Therefore, political promotion events are plausibly 
exogenous to the market before their public announcements and can be a possible area 
that institutional investors may acquire private information about and exploit prior to 
the official announcements.  
There are several competing hypotheses on the relationship between political 
promotion and institutional investors' shareholding. First, we consider whether 
institutions conduct informed trading before a promotion happens. Institutions usually 
hire experts who are professional at investments to manage their funds so it is 
reasonable for them to obtain a higher return than retail investors frequently. 
Nonetheless, they also have superior information environment. Their employees may 
have working experience in regulatory bodies or listed firms and they can directly 
communicate with management of invested firms and financial analysts. The abundant 
information channels enable institutions to make predictions more precisely to support 
the success of informed trading. A news report from Sina finance in 2014 stated that 
at least 40 mutual fund senior management team members are former officials in the 
4 
China Securities Regulatory Commission based on public available data. 1  Once 
institutions are informed, they will adjust their portfolios ahead of events occurrence. 
If institutions do not have such private information, we should expect no difference 
between institutional investors' shareholding of firms exposed to political promotion 
and those of firms do not experience promotion before the event really occurs.  
If institutions are informed of a promotion event, the next question is what is 
institutions' expectation on the reaction of firms to political promotion. Two sets of 
theories can be used to predict firms' behavior when political promotion takes place. 
One is the political uncertainty theory and the other one is the political influence theory. 
The political uncertainty theory argues that companies worry about the possible bad 
results of political events and would like to avoid the loss associated with them. Julio 
and Yook (2012) study the effects of national elections on corporate investment in 48 
countries from 1980 to 2005. Their results show that uncertainty induced by elections 
lead to temporary reduction of corporate investment expenditure until the uncertainty 
dismisses. Gulen and Ion (2016) find similar results at the aggregate level of 
uncertainty. They empirically support the argument that policy uncertainty causes 
companies to be so mindful about the possible potential loss of investment that they 
prefer to postpone their projects to avoid waste of funds, which suppresses corporate 
                                                 
1 http://finance.sina.com.cn/money/fund/20140519/104219151671.shtml 
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investment. In this case, firms under the influence of political promotion events should 
slow down their development before the promotion. This is negative news to the stock 
market. In view of this, informed institutional investors will hold less shares of firms 
experiencing promotion events before the events. 
The political influence theory means government will directly affect companies by 
regulations and policies. Some literature studies the political influence on firm 
behavior. In 1996, Qian points out the drawback of the practice that Chinese state-
owned enterprises (SOEs) only delegate part of the control rights to professional 
managers and the government remains the ultimate controll. The agency costs are high 
because managers do not own the firms and do not need to be responsible for decisions 
made for the firms. Meanwhile the political costs are also high as the government has 
to intervene to mitigate the agency problem. He suggests further ownership reform for 
SOEs. Fan et al. (2013) provide empirical results showing the result of SOE ownership 
reform is the balance of agency costs and political costs. Chen and Yuan (2004) finds 
out that listed firms were enthusiastic to conduct earnings management from 1996 to 
1998 as they were required to achieve a minimum return on equity (ROE) of 10%. If 
the political influence theory is dominant, it is expected bureaucrats support the 
development of enterprises within his jurisdiction in order to increase the chance of 
promotion before the event. On this occasion, the institutional investors are supposed 
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to increase their shareholding of firms exposed to promotion before the events. 
To test our hypotheses, we manually collect data on the promotion events of provincial 
leaders from 31 provinces in China and merge the data with the percentage of non-
financial listed A-share firms shares held by institutions from 2003 to 2014. China is 
a country where politics matters a lot in business. If politics does affect institutional 
investors, we should be able to find results. The provincial level of promotion is an 
appropriate setting. Since firms in our sample are all listed firms which are the largest 
group of corporations in the country, the provincial leader is powerful enough to issue 
policies to influence these firms within his province. On the other hand, a provincial 
leader is the highest official for a local government. The only promotion target for 
them is the central government once they get promoted. Hence, it is easy to distinguish 
promotion from other kinds of turnover based on the title of positions after events. The 
reason why we start from 2003 is that the Chinese Securities Investment Fund Law is 
stipulated in that year. The mutual fund industry is not regulated before 2003 and we 
are unable to get credible data.  
The results show that institutional investors adjust their trading strategies in view of 
the promotion of the provincial leaders. They increase their purchase of shares of 
companies located in the provinces where a promotion is going to take place one year 
later. The average change of shares held by mutual funds for firms experiencing 
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promotion is 0.9% greater than that of firms not exposed to promotion. Given that the 
mean of mutual funds shareholding is around 10%, on average mutual funds purchase 
relatively 9% more shares of companies experiencing promotion than companies not 
experiencing promotion. The institutional shareholding levels of these firms are higher 
than that of other firms in the first two years after the promotion event takes place. In 
the year when promotion occurs, mutual funds on average hold 0.9% more shares from 
firms experiencing promotion events compared with other firms. In the year after the 
event year, the average drops to 0.7% which means mutual funds realize part of the 
profits from political promotion. Our analysis of the stock return shows that the 
portfolio of stocks of firms in the promotion provinces have  5% -7% greater 
cumulative abnormal return compared to the rest. Institutional investors are experts in 
investment who are good at taking advantage of information. Given that some 
managers in these institutions are former government officials and former listed firm 
employees, institutional investors have much broader information channel than others. 
They are able to know the promotion favorable to firms. The empirical results imply 
that mutual funds is able to know the information of future political promotion prior 
to the event's occurrence and increase their profits accordingly. 
This paper contributes to the literature in the following aspects. Even though there is 
a large quantity of research examining the function of institutional investors on firms’ 
8 
performance and organization, few studies have considered what factors can influence 
the investment portfolio decisions of institutional investors. The current situation is 
that the public understands the significance of institutional investors but has little idea 
the behavior pattern of institutional investors based on information available. This 
paper is complementary to this line of research. It also draws attention to future 
research in this area as much is still remained unknown to us. 
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to document that political events can 
affect investors’ portfolios. Previous studies mainly focus on the macro economic 
effects of political events or the corporate level reaction to those events. This paper 
pushes down the research to a more concrete organizational investor level.  
This study uses China as setting to test the impact of politics on institutional investors. 
It can provide some inspiration on the potential research on other sort of influence 
induced by political power in emerging market. Since emerging economy is often 
associated with weak institutions, the power of politics is usually stronger in economic 
development. It is an inevitable force in those markets which should be further 
explored. 
Our research can also provide policy implications for regulatory bodies. The purpose 
of institutional investors is not only for them to receive trading profits but also to 
increase the stability of stock market as a result of the monitoring function of 
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institutional investors. The regulatory body might consider new rules to restrain the 
implicit connection between institutional investors and itself in order to increase their 
exposure to the scrutiny of regulatory bodies. 
The rest of the paper is organized as the follows. Chapter 2 introduces the institutional 
background of key concepts. Chapter 3 gives literature review on political promotion 
research and institutional investor studies in China. Chapter 4 develops our hypotheses 
about the effects of political promotion on mutual funds’ trading. Chapter 5 illustrates 
the data source, sample selection process, the research design to test the hypotheses 
and descriptive statistics. Chapter 6 is the empirical results of our studies. Eventually, 
we conclude and reflect on our studies in Chapter 7. 
Chapter 2 Institutional Background 
2.1 Introduction of political promotion 
Politics plays an important role in modern economic activities. Governments are policy 
makers and regulators guiding the economy. Economy develops under the influence 
of political power. Jones and Olken (2005) document that national leaders matter for 
the countries’ economic growth. They appear to affect the outcomes of countries’ 
policies especially monetary policies. The effects become stronger in nations where 
the leader’s personal power is less limited. Like the national leaders, other levels of 
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bureaucrats also exert their influence over economy. One sort of typical political events 
is the promotion of local government officials. In this paper, we define the concept of 
political promotion as the process that a local government official obtain a position in 
the central government which is usually a position with more power compared to the 
old one. Since local economy is more directly influenced by local force compared to 
the central power, local governors are responsible to support local economic 
development which may increase their chance of promotion. In China, this 
phenomenon is prevalent for each level of government officials. China is a country 
where the political power is believed to be strong. It used to employ planned economy 
system and decided to transit to market economy system. However, the government 
remains great power to influence the economy during the transition stage. Li (1998) 
notes that at the start of the transformation of system, the central government mandated 
that all levels of bureaucrats were supposed to know about capitalist ideas and allowed 
to quit government to join businesses. In this situation, their incentives to push 
economic development are increased. The duties of provincial leaders include 
supporting the economic system transformation, attracting investment from entities 
outside the province, boosting the prosperity of private enterprises, improving 
infrastructure conditions and cooperating with other regions. The emphasis of 
bureaucratic evaluation standard has shifted from political outcomes to economic 
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accomplishments. One essential indicator for the likelihood of government officials’ 
promotion to higher level of government is their economic achievements during their 
tenure as provincial governors or secretaries of the party. If the official can demonstrate 
that he has the ability to advance economic construction, the chance of his promotion 
will rise. On the other hand, the number limit of positions in the central government 
creates a “competitive job market” for local bureaucrats. Facing the limited supply of 
job posts in the central government, local government officials who demand for higher 
positions must compete with each other. Under this circumstance, provincial leaders 
have the incentives to acquire better economic outcomes to increase the likelihood of 
promotion. 
2.2 Introduction of institutional investors 
Institutional investors are organizations that trade securities in large enough share 
quantities compared to individual investors. They are usually managed by 
knowledgeable people who are supposed to have better investment strategies. They are 
important components of minority shareholders. Even though they do not hold share 
for control purpose, their large quantity of shareholding enable them to negotiate with 
firms to influence their business. Starting form Hirschman (1970), institutional 
investors usually have two choices to deal with invested firms. One is engagement 
with management to make changes (“voice”) and the other one is threat to sell shares 
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of the firm (“exit”). Aggarwal et al. (2011) analyze institutional portfolio holdings in 
companies from 23 countries and provide empirical results for the corporate 
governance role played by institutional investors. The growth of institutional 
ownership over time can contribute to the subsequent enhancement of firm-level 
corporate governance mechanisms and outcomes. The significance corporate 
government function is further confirmed by McCahery et al. (2016). They use survey 
data directly collected from managers working for institutional investors and get the 
conclusion that institutional investors indeed use “voice” and “exit” methods to 
motivate the firms to improve their corporate governance.  
2.3 Introduction of mutual funds industry in China 
In China, the majority of institutional investors is mutual funds. Chinese mutual fund 
industry has a relatively short history. Currently, there are 121 mutual fund companies 
in China with total assets of 9,181 billion CNY. The first mutual fund in China was set 
in 2001 and the mutual fund industry was formally established in 2003 by the 
stipulation of Securities Investment Fund Law. Before that, mutual funds could not be 
distinguished from other kinds of investment funds since funds were allowed to invest 
in any products not necessarily securities. This caused the severe heterogeneity in 
funds in respect of return rate, risk, size, etc. In view of the chaos in fund industry, the 
Securities Investment Fund Law also clear states mutual funds should operate under 
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the scrutiny of China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC). 
A feature of Chinese mutual funds is they prefer to employ former government officials, 
especially those who have worked in the CSRC. Because the law does not clearly 
restrict members of CSRC to work in mutual fund companies after they leave, some 
CSRC officials are willing to work in mutual funds firms for better personal wealth. 
These people are familiar with the working of CSRC so they can help mutual funds to 
better cope with the regulation of CSRC. They also know current officials in CSRC 
who can provide privileges to “acquaintances” in mutual funds. In this way, mutual 
funds creates informal connection to CSRC to gain benefits.  
2.4 Introduction of China’s government official promotions 
There are 4 levels of local government which are provincial level, prefecture level, 
county level and township level. Even though the administrative rank of an official is 
not simply equivalent to the level of government where he works, a politician of a 
higher level of government usually has higher rank than people from a lower level of 
government. Each level of government is ultimately led by a secretary of the party as 
China requires the CPC to guide everything. Nowadays, China has established a “civil 
service” system to organize government officials. Normally if a person would like to 
work in the government, he/she must pass national examination for admissions to the 
civil service and be selected by a department of the basic level government (usually 
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the county level government as the township level government is formed by local 
residents). Well-performed civil servants (i.e. officials) will get chance to be granted 
higher ranks and promoted to higher positions. When he takes office of the secretary 
of the party of that level of government, the higher level of government is responsible 
to decide whether to promote the person to this level of government. The promotion 
takes place step by step, that is, no skip to the next rank is allowed. The selection 
criteria are never disclosed to the public. Nonetheless, ages, education background, 
working experience and achievements during the tenure are all factors considered for 
promotions. Once a politician has become the secretary of party for the provincial level 
government, the central government can decide whether give him a position in the 
central government, which is actually a promotion from the local government to the 
central government. 
Chapter 3. Literature Review 
3.1 Political turnover and promotion in China                                          
Since China is a country where political power plays an important role for several 
decades, the economic and financial effects associated with political events has been 
widely studies in China. A set of literature focus on the economic impact of 
bureaucrat’s turnover and promotion. Li and Zhou (2005) documents that the Chinese 
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governments sets bureaucrat promotion requirements to guide local leaders to obtain 
desirable economic outcomes. The likelihood of promotion of provincial leaders 
increases with their economic performance, while the likelihood of termination 
decreases with their economic performance. The turnover of provincial leaders is more 
sensitive to their average performance over their tenure than to their annual 
performance. Chen et al. (2005) argues that relative performance evaluation scheme is 
actually used in the turnover decisions made by the central government. When 
considering the turnover of provincial leaders, the central government compare the 
provincial economic performance of the leader with that of his immediate predecessor. 
Shih et al. (2012) provides an opposite story. Even though it is reasonable that 
motivated local administrators compete with one another to generate high growth, they 
fail to find evidence that strong growth performance was rewarded with higher party 
ranks at any of the post reform party congresses. Instead, other political and personal 
reasons are more relevant to officials’ promotion. They conclude that promotion is 
more a representative of leaders’ will than a payoff of economic development 
achievements. Piotroski et al. (2015) argue that politicians and their affiliated firms 
(i.e. firms operating in their province) temporarily suppress negative information 
before the meetings of the National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party and 
promotions of high-level provincial politicians. This results fewer stock price crashes 
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for the affiliated firms during these event windows, followed by an increase in crashes 
after the event. Consistent with these predictions, they find that the affiliated firms 
experience a reduction (an increase) in negative stock return skewness before (after) 
the event.  
3.2 Institutional investors in China 
Current institutional investor research focus on the function of institutional investors 
to firms and markets. Yuan et al. (2008) find that equity ownership by mutual funds 
has a positive effect on firm performance. Their results support efforts to promote 
mutual funds as a corporate governance mechanism and suggest that pooling diffuse 
minority interests of individual shareholders who are prone to free-rider problems via 
mutual funds is beneficial. Yao and Liu (2009) find that China’s institutional investors 
play an active role in controlling insider expropriation through equity financing. Firth 
et al. (2010) find that state ownership has a positive effect on the final compensation 
ratio. In contrast, mutual fund ownership has a negative effect on the compensation 
ratio and especially in state-owned firms. The evidence is consistent with the 
explanation that state shareholders have incentives to complete the reform quickly and 
exert political pressure on mutual funds to accept the terms without a fight. 
Wu et al. (2016) observe that firms that have a large proportion of their shares held by 
institutional investors are less likely to receive enforcement actions against corporate 
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fraud. Institutional ownership plays a more important role in declining regulatory 
enforcement incidents against state-owned enterprises. Firth et al. (2016) find that 
mutual funds influence firms to pay higher cash dividends. The effects are more 
pronounced in firms controlled by state and regional governments and in firms with 
relatively higher free cash flows. They also provide evidence that the mutual funds’ 
effects are stronger when their investment horizon is longer and the ownership interest 
is larger. Other institutional investors, such as banks, insurance companies, and 
securities companies have a lower exit threat and do not have an influence on firms’ 
cash dividend payments or financial performances. 
Chapter 4 Hypothesis Development 
Institutional investors usually possess superior information gathering and processing 
capabilities. Boehmer and Kelley (2009) points out that institutions can react to news 
within 30 minutes after its release. Their trading enhances the market price efficiency 
as other investors follow their transactions which are timely reactions to new available 
information. In China, institutions recruit part of its employees from regulatory body, 
listed firms and other types of institutions. In this way, they establish informal 
information channels through social ties of their staff. In an emerging market like 
China where institutions and governance is weak, private information channels and 
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personal relationship are favorable to improve the information environment to gain 
benefits in business. It is possible for mutual funds to receive private information 
regarding future promotion of officials. They have the ability to adjust their investment 
portfolios ahead of the occurrence of promotion events. Hence, they are capable of 
informed trading ahead of promotion events.  
From the perspective of companies, they can acquire information from established 
links with incumbent leaders. Firms can know the future change of local governors in 
advance. However, it is possible they are unable to foresee the identity of the incoming 
provincial leader. The leave of the incumbent and the induction of the successor may 
not be decided simultaneously. The successor can be either promoted from the same 
province or transferred from other provinces. An unknown future local leader means 
uncertainty about the policies in the future. Hence, firms are likely to hold investments 
to avoid potential loss associated with uncertainty.  
As Piotroski and Zhang (2014) mention, political promotions are intensively correlated 
with local economic development. Local provincial leaders can accumulate personal 
wealth through support initial public offerings (IPOs). They will be rewarded for 
capital market development. Prior research also documents officials are likely to 
receive promotion after they have accomplished remarkable economic achievements. 
These bureaucrats have incentives to support firm development. Firms can benefit 
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from favorable policies, better investment environment and improved information 
environment. These conditions provide firms with opportunities to increase 
investments for greater growth. It is also reasonable for firms to boost their 
development under such circumstance.  
Based on the competing theories, we have the following hypotheses with no predicted 
directions. 
H1: Other things being equal, the promotion events of local leaders affects the level of 
mutual funds’ shareholding percentage of firms.  
H2: Other things being equal, the promotion events of local leaders affects the change 
of mutual funds’ shareholding percentage of firms. 
Chapter 5 Data, Sample and Research Design 
5.1 Data and sample construction 
In this research, our data sources are Wind Information (Wind), China Stock Market 
and Accounting Research (CSMAR) and China’s government websites. Wind provides 
the percentage of shares held by institutional investors and stock return and firm 
financial data are from CSMAR. We hand collect the promotion information of 
provincial leaders of 31 provinces in China from their resumes and announcement of 
taking office posted on "the People's website" (http://www.people.com.cn/). This 
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website belongs to the Publicity Department of the Communist Party of China and one 
of its function is to publicize the change of positions of senior government officials 
decided by the central government. To increase the transparency of these appointments, 
the education background and working experience of the officials will be disclosed at 
the same time. Figure 1 shows the frequency of promotion events for each year. The 
frequencies for 2007 and 2012 are higher than other years as they are the start year of 
a new group of central government officials.  
To better distinguish influence of political promotion from time trend, we use a 
difference-in-difference (DID) approach. Figure 2 and Figure 3 illustrates the process 
of our DID sample construction. For every year of the period 2005-2014, we divide 
provinces into treatment groups and control groups. If a promotion event occurs in a 
province, this province is classified as one element of the treatment group for that 
specific year. The remaining provinces without promotion events are the control group 
for that year. Given that promotion occur for multiple times, we construct episodes to 
build our testing sample. Figure 2 shows how we define an episode of our sample. An 
episode is a 5-year period of which the event year is in the middle. In other words, we 
attach two years before the event and two years after the event to each treatment group 
and control group. In an episode, a province is regarded as an element of the treatment 
group for the whole 5-year period as long as it is classified into treatment group in the 
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event year (t=0), regardless of its original classifications in other years.2 Similarly, if 
a province is classified into the control group in the event year, it is in the control group 
for the whole period. Based on the province episode, we pick up firm-year 
observations affiliated to the provinces in the two groups to form the firm-year episode. 
Figure 3 shows how to select years to combine episodes into the final sample. We build 
episodes on a rolling basis. In this way, each episode alone is a small subsample for 
the DID test. The ultimate sample we use to analyze is the combination of ten episodes. 
5.2 Research design 
We use the following models to conduct both level and change analyses: 
MF_HOLDሺ∆MF_HOLDሻ ൌ	∝ ൅ߚଵܴܶܧܣܶ ൅ ߚଶܴܲܧ ൅ ߚଷܴܶܧܣܶ ∗ ܴܲܧ ൅
γCONTROL ൅ ε                                             (1)  
 
MF_HOLDሺ∆MF_HOLDሻ ൌ	∝ ൅ߚଵܴܶܧܣܶ ൅ ߚଶܴܲܧ2 ൅ ߚଷܴܲܧ1 ൅ ߚସܱܲܵܶ0 ൅
ߚହܱܲܵܶ1 ൅ ߚ଺ܴܶܧܣܶ ∗ ܴܲܧ2 ൅ ߚ଻ܴܶܧܣܶ ∗ ܴܲܧ1൅	ߚ଼ܴܶܧܣܶ ∗ ܱܲܵܶ0 ൅
                                                 
2Here we do not restrict the episode to be an entirely clean one given the following concerns. First, the 
likelihood of promotion is different for developed and developing provinces. Sometimes the central 
government reappoints a provincial leader to a more developed province before he is formally promoted 
to the position in the central government. If we require a totally clean sample, the observations are 
dramatically reduced and they are mainly from less developed provinces, which gives biased results. 
Second, for a single province, promotion seldom occurs for consecutive years.  
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ߚଽܴܶܧܣܶ ∗ ܱܲܵܶ1 ൅ γCONTROL ൅ ε                           (2) 
 
Model 1 is the typical DID regression. MF_HOLD is the percentage of a firm's shares 
owned by mutual funds, calculated as the number of shares owned by mutual funds 
divided by the total number of shares in issue. TREAT is a dummy variable equals 1 if 
a firm is located in a province where the provincial governor or the secretary of the 
provincial committee is promoted to the central government in the event year, and 0 
otherwise. PRE is a dummy variable equals 1 if this year is one or two years before a 
provincial governor or secretary of the provincial committee is promoted to the central 
government, and 0 otherwise. PRE*TREAT is the interaction term to capture the diff-
in-diff effects. CONTROL stands for the following group of control variables. MB is 
the market value of assets divided by the book value of assets at the year end. Market 
value of assets is defined as the market value of equity plus book value of debts. LEV 
is the leverage ratio calculated as total liabilities over total assets at the year end. Size 
is the natural logarithm of a firm's total assets at the year end. ROA is the return on 
assets calculated as net profits divided by total assets. CR is the current ratio, computed 
as current assets divided by current liabilities at the end of the year. AR is the accounts 
receivable intensity, computed as the ending balances of accounts receivable divided 
by total assets at the end of the year. INV is Inventory intensity, computed as the ending 
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balances of inventories divided by total assets at the end of the year. GDP is the gross 
domestic product of the province where the firm locates. STATESHARE is the 
percentage of a firm's shares owned by the central or local government, calculated as 
the number of shares owned by the government divided by the total number of shares 
in issue.  
Model 2 is the dynamics of DID regression. We replace the original single time 
indicators with 4 year indicators representing different stages in the DID sample. PRE2 
is 2 years before the event year. PRE1 refers to the year before the event year. POST0 
stands for the event year and POST1 means one year after the promotion year. 
ΔMF_HOLD is the annual change of percentage of shares held by mutual funds, i.e. 
the difference between the percentage of shares held by mutual funds of the current 
year and that of last year. The control variables for the change analysis are replaced 
with their respective change format similar to the change in mutual fund shareholding. 
5.3 Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics. Panel A of Table 1 shows summary statistics 
for the whole sample composed of 10 episodes. The average percentage of share held 
by mutual funds is 9.84% while the median is 3.46%. The mean of annual change of 
percentage of mutual funds shareholding is -0.48% and the median of that is -0.04%. 
Panel B of Table 1 demonstrates the univariate tests of the difference between the 
24 
treatment group and the control group before and after the event. Before the promotion 
event occurs, the percentage of shares held by mutual funds for firms in treatment 
groups is less than that for companies in the control group, though not statistically 
significant. This implies that before the promotion occurs, mutual funds are likely to 
hold less percentage of shares of firms in the treatment group than firms in the control 
groups. This difference reduces after the occurrence of political promotion events, 
which shows during the event mutual funds increase their percentage of shares held 
for treated companies compared to the control group. 
Chapter 6 Empirical Results 
6.1 Annual change of mutual fund shareholding 
Table 2 shows the regression results of impact of political promotion on annual change 
of mutual fund shareholding percentage. Column 1 and 2 of Table 2 are the results of 
the typical DID model (model (1)). PRE is statistically significantly negatively 
associated withΔMF_HOLD. For the control group, the general trend of mutual fund 
shareholding level is decline before the event occurs. Nonetheless, given that 
TREAT*PRE is statistically significantly positively related toΔMF_HOLD and its 
magnitude is apparently large than PRE, we can find that the percentage of shares held 
by mutual funds is increasing for the period before the promotions. This preliminary 
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result shows mutual funds already start to increase their holdings of shares of firms 
which are going to experience the promotion events before the provincial leader is 
actually promoted to the central government. 
Column 3 of Table 2 is the result of the dynamic version DID model (model (2)). This 
column provides us with a clearer picture of the annual change of mutual fund 
shareholdings. The coefficients for PRE2 and PRE1 are statistically significantly 
negative at 10% level and 1% level respectively. In fact, we break down the before-
event period into two separate years and find the decrease of mutual fund shareholding 
for control group firms mainly happens one year before the event occurs. In contrast, 
the coefficients of TREAT*PRE2 and TREAT*PRE1 are statistically significantly 
positive at 10% level and 1% level respectively. Combining the effects of time term 
and interaction term, we find mutual funds explicitly increase their shareholding of 
firms belonging to the treatment groups, especially in the year immediately before the 
event year. Based on the results of Table 2, mutual funds appear to adjust their 
portfolios ahead of the promotion eventually occurs. It seems that mutual funds are 
able to foresee the future event of provincial leader’s promotion. However, the 
promotion decision is made public when the politician has taken office of the new 
position. One possible explanation for the predictability of mutual funds is that they 
manage to know the promotion message ahead of the public. 
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6.2 Mutual fund shareholding percentage 
Table 3 shows the regression results of the promotion effects on the level of percentage 
of firm shares held by mutual funds. The coefficients of TREAT*PRE1, 
TREAT*POST0 and TREAT*POST1 are statistically significantly positive while the 
coefficients of TREAT*PRE2 is not statistically significant. This demonstrates mutual 
funds tend to hold more shares of firms that has experienced political promotion events 
than shares of firms do not exposed to promotion before the event actually takes place. 
Combined the results of Table 2 and Table 3, we can find that compared to shares of 
firms located in provinces without promotion, mutual funds act as they know the 
incoming events before they really happen. Mutual funds will accelerate the 
accumulation of shares of firms in provinces with promotion before the promotion and 
retain a higher level of stock holding percentage after the event. 
6.3 Cumulative portfolio return 
To further strengthen the credibility of our research, we calculate the cumulative stock 
return and the cumulative market-adjusted abnormal return. Figure 4 illustrates the 
trend of cumulative stock returns for the consecutive 48 months starting from the year 
before the event happens. In the first 12 months, the returns for the two groups are 
almost the same. The two lines start to divide in after the 13rd month, i.e., in the event 
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year. The return of the portfolio of treatment groups is apparently higher than that of 
the control group. Table 4 shows the regression results of cumulative stock returns and 
cumulative abnormal returns associated with the political promotion events. The 
coefficients of TREAT*POST1 and TREAT*POST2 are statistically significant in 
both columns and the coefficient of TREAT*POST0 is statistically significant for the 
cumulative abnormal return model. Generally, the cumulative returns of the stocks in 
the treatment group are higher than those of firms in the control group. Mutual funds 
can increase their trading profits by adjusting its trading portfolio according to the 
promotion events in different provinces. 
6.4 Political connections 
To better analyze our research question, we divided the full sample into two 
subsamples based on the state-owned share percentage. We use 20% of the share as 
the cutoff point which is used by Piotroski et al. (2015). Government holding over 20% 
of a firm’s share can exert strong influence on the firm’s operation. If more than 20% 
of a firm's outstanding shares are controlled by the government, the company is 
classified as a firm with high state-owner share percentage. The remaining 
corporations are in the group of low state-owned share percentage firms. Table 5 shows 
the regression results of the two groups. The effect of promotion only occurs in the 
subsample composed of low state-owned share percentage. Our explanation for this 
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phenomenon is mutual funds believe firms with high state-owned share percentages 
have enough political connection and they do not necessarily to rely on the 
opportunities created by political promotion events while firms with low state-owned 
share percentage attach much importance to the promotion events of provincial leaders. 
Chapter 7 Conclusion 
This paper documents the institutional investors informed trading in the context of 
political promotion in China. The results show that institutional investors will 
accelerate their purchase of shares of firms that will experience political promotion 
events next year before the promotion event occur. Their shareholding of the firm 
experiencing promotion events are significantly higher than that of companies not 
exposed to political promotions. These evidences indicate institutions receive private 
information about the future promotion events ahead of the occurrence of these events 
and they also expect their invested firms will take chance to develop, which is a 
positive signal for the whole market. We also examine the cumulative return of the 
portfolios of the two groups of companies and find that the cumulative stock return 
and cumulative abnormal return for the portfolios of corporations exposed to political 
promotion events is higher. Institutional investors obtain higher return by adjusting 
their portfolios based on those promotion events. In addition, when we divide the firms 
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into two subsamples, the difference in change of shareholding percentage only shows 
in the group of firms with low state-own share percentage. This may be explained as 
firms with low state-own share percentage count more on the favorable environment 
created by the political promotion events.  
Our paper focuses on the effect of an aspect of concrete factors, politics, on institutions’ 
informed trading behavior. Future research can explore the impact of other types of 
stimulus on informed trading so as to resolve the current contradiction of informed 
trading literature.  
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Appendix: Variable Definitions
Variable Definition
MF_HOLD
Percentage of a firm's shares owned by mutual funds, calculated as the
number of shares owned by mutual funds divided by the total number of
shares in issue
TREAT
A dummy variable equals 1 if a firm is located in a province where provincial
governor or secretary of the provincial committee is promoted to the central
government in the event year, and 0 otherwise
PRE
A dummy variable equals 1 if this year is one or two years before a provincial
governor or secretary of the provincial committee is promoted to the central
government, and 0 otherwise
PRE2
A dummy variable equals 1 if this year is two years before a provincial
governor or secretary of the provincial committee is promoted to the central
government, and 0 otherwise
PRE1
A dummy variable equals 1 if this year is one year before a provincial governor
or secretary of the provincial committee is promoted to the central
government, and 0 otherwise
POST0
A dummy variable equals 1 if a provincial governor or secretary of the
provincial committee is promoted to the central government in this year, and 0
otherwise
POST1
A dummy variable equals 1 if this year is one year after a provincial governor
or secretary of the provincial committee is promoted to the central
government, and 0 otherwise
POST2
A dummy variable equals 1 if this year is two years after a provincial governor
or secretary of the provincial committee is promoted to the central
government, and 0 otherwise
RET Cumulative monthly stock returns
CAR Cumulative monthly market-adjusted stock returns
MB
The market value of assets divided by the book value of assest at the year end.
Market value of assets is defined as the market value of equity plus book value
of debts
LEV The leverage ratio calculated as total liabilities over total assets at the year end
Size Natural logarithm of a firm's total assets at the year end
ROA Return on assets calculated as net profits divided by total assets
CR Current ratio,computed as current assets divided by current liabilities at the end
of the year
AR Accounts receivable intensity, computed as the ending balances of accounts
receivable divided by total assets at the end of the year
INV Inventory intensity, computed as the ending balances of inventories divided by
total assets at the end of the year
GDP The natural logarithm of gross domestic product of the province where the
firm locates
STATESHARE
Percentage of a firm's shares owned by the central or local government,
calculated as the number of shares owned by the government divided by the
total number of shares in issue
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Figure 1 Annual political promotion frequencies for the year 2003-2014 
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Figure 2 Construction of an episode 
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Figure 3 Construction of sample with episodes on a rolling basis
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Figure 4 48-month cumulative stock return 
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Table 1       
Summary Statistics      
This table shows the summary statistics. Panel A reports the descriptive statistics for the full sample. Panel B 
reports the t-test results between the two groups before and after the political promotion events. *, **, *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% levels respectively. Definition of variables are specified in the Appendix. 
Panel A      
  N Mean standard deviation 25th percentile median 75th percentile
  
MF_HOLD 45,805  9.8403 13.7852 0.4611 3.4562 13.7663 
ΔMF_HOLD 39,412  -0.4796 10.6356 -3.7478 -0.0426 2.4265 
MB 45,805  1.7689 1.5201 0.7451 1.3170 2.2291 
LEV 45,805  0.4706 0.2030 0.3207 0.4849 0.6253 
SIZE 45,805  21.9095 1.1886 21.0451 21.7446 22.5973 
ROA 45,805  0.0535 0.0655 0.0173 0.0464 0.0846 
CR 45,805  2.1051 2.4489 0.9643 1.3588 2.1421 
AR 45,805  0.0991 0.0939 0.0245 0.0738 0.1467 
INV 45,805  0.1718 0.1521 0.0694 0.1350 0.2214 
GDP 45,805  7.3813 0.8421 6.8638 7.4492 8.0386 
SOE 45,805  0.5631 0.4960 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
STATESHARE 45,805  15.9111 22.8181 0.0000 0.0000 32.8399 
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Table 1(continued）      
Panel B       
    Mean   Difference p-value 
  Treat Control   
Before MF_HOLD 10.2897 10.4231  -0.133 -0.609 
 ΔMF_HOLD 0.2005 0.2649  -0.0644 -0.775 
 MB 1.7295 1.6746  0.0548* -0.042 
 LEV 0.4770 0.4900  -0.0130*** 0 
 SIZE 21.7919 21.7717  0.0201 -0.325 
 ROA 0.0542 0.0520  0.00221 -0.067 
 CR 2.0467 1.7294  0.317*** 0 
 AR 0.1036 0.1009  0.00263 -0.121 
 INV 0.1716 0.1712  0.00044 -0.868 
 GDP 7.2840 6.9898  0.294*** 0 
 SOE 0.5783 0.6444  -0.0661*** 0 
 STATESHARE 20.0238 24.6503  -4.893*** 0 
 N 3,642  8,832   
After MF_HOLD 9.4817 9.5994  -0.118 -0.49 
 ΔMF_HOLD -1.0261 -0.7326  -0.293* -0.034 
 MB 1.8482 1.7930  0.0552** -0.004 
 LEV 0.448  0.4676  -0.0178*** 0 
 SIZE 21.9959 21.9680  0.0279 -0.07 
 ROA 0.0539 0.0539  -0.0000372 -0.964 
 CR 2.4167 2.1832  0.233*** 0 
 AR 0.1026 0.0960  0.00660*** 0 
 INV 0.1700 0.1727 -0.00274 -0.163 
 GDP 7.7454 7.4545  0.291*** 0 
 SOE 0.4782 0.5525  -0.0743*** 0 
 STATESHARE 9.6756 13.2069  -3.531*** 0 
  N 7,618  19,320      
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Table 2    
Effects of political promotion on change of institutional ownership  
This table shows the regression results of political promotion events on the annual change of 
institutional holding.  Robust p-values are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance 
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. Definition of variables are specified in the Appendix. 
 Dependent variable: ΔMF_HOLD  
  (1) (2) (3) 
TREAT -0.164 -0.152 -0.454* 
 (0.192) (0.134) (0.0884) 
PRE -0.259*** -0.265*** 
 (0.000292) (0.000161) 
TREAT × PRE 0.900*** 0.916*** 
 (0.000576) (0.000315) 
PRE2 -0.227* 
 (0.0961) 
PRE1 -0.432*** 
 (0.000139) 
POST0 -0.163 
 (0.137) 
POST1 -0.0412 
 (0.600) 
TREAT × PRE2 0.784 
 
 
(0.102) 
TREAT × PRE1 
 
1.585*** 
 (0.000245) 
TREAT × POST0 0.707* 
 (0.0974) 
TREAT × POST1 0.245 
 (0.429) 
ΔMB 2.739*** 2.778*** 2.779*** 
 (0) (0) (0) 
ΔLEV 2.069 1.303 1.312 
 (0.241) (0.499) (0.496) 
ΔSIZE 5.025*** 5.512*** 5.509*** 
 (1.63e-08) (3.14e-07) (3.18e-07) 
ΔROA 13.78*** 12.30*** 12.29*** 
 (2.38e-06) (4.29e-05) (4.30e-05) 
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Table 2(continued）    
ΔCR -0.00348 0.0305 0.0295 
 (0.970) (0.818) (0.824) 
ΔAR -7.339*** -7.393** -7.343** 
 (0.00925) (0.0174) (0.0185) 
ΔINV -1.895 -1.568 -1.589 
 (0.292) (0.442) (0.436) 
ΔGDP 1.129*** 0.900** 0.910** 
 (0.000389) (0.0115) (0.0106) 
ΔSTATESHARE 0.0812*** 0.0844*** 0.0846*** 
 (4.64e-10) (2.66e-09) (2.52e-09) 
Constant -8.177*** -7.113*** -7.005*** 
 (1.31e-05) (0.000681) (0.000792) 
Observations 39,412 39,412 39,412 
R-squared 0.134 0.193 0.193 
sample period 2003-2014 2003-2014 2003-2014 
cluster se province province province 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes 
Province FE Yes 
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Table 3     
Effects of political promotion on level of institutional ownership 
This table shows the regression results of political promotion events on the levels of institutional 
holding.  Robust p-values are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 
5%, 1% levels respectively. Definition of variables are specified in the Appendix. 
 Dependent variable: MF_HOLD  
  (1) (2) (3) 
TREAT -0.991 -1.220* 0.0265 
 (0.139) (0.0863) (0.922) 
PRE2 1.341** 2.221*** 0.0229 
 (0.0189) (2.92e-08) (0.846) 
PRE1 0.928** 1.823*** -0.317** 
 (0.0165) (2.40e-08) (0.0298) 
POST0 0.559** 1.442*** -0.259* 
 (0.0200) (4.85e-08) (0.0649) 
POST1 0.380*** 0.458*** -0.168** 
 (0.00889) (0.00783) (0.0462) 
TREAT × PRE2 0.352 0.445 -0.429 
 (0.757) (0.480) (0.239) 
TREAT × PRE1 1.284 1.281** 0.834** 
 (0.118) (0.0359) (0.0391) 
TREAT × POST0 1.804*** 1.444* 0.761* 
 (0.00906) (0.0614) (0.0662) 
TREAT × POST1 0.989** 1.914*** 0.583** 
 (0.0194) (0.00172) (0.0392) 
MB 2.942*** 3.411*** 
 (0) (0) 
LEV 9.882*** 8.583*** 
 (1.56e-07) (2.65e-07) 
SIZE 2.557*** 3.304*** 
 (0) (0) 
ROA 71.09*** 61.79*** 
 (0) (0) 
CR 0.150 0.221** 
 (0.117) (0.0190) 
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Table 3(continued）    
AR 
 
7.747*** 8.550*** 
 
 
(0.00109) (0.000291) 
INV 
 
-1.244 -1.309 
 
 
(0.181) (0.119) 
SOE 
 
-0.706 -1.407*** 
 
 
(0.186) (0.00257) 
GDP 
 
-0.564 -1.240 
 
 
(0.152) (0.553) 
Constant 9.305*** -57.16*** -69.82*** 
 (0) (0) (2.07e-06) 
Observations 45,805 45,805 45,805 
R-squared 0.002 0.276 0.333 
sample period 2003-2014 2003-2014 2003-2014 
cluster se province province province 
Year FE Yes 
Province FE Yes 
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Table 4 
Stock market reaction to political promotion  
This table shows the regression results of political promotion events on cumulative market returns. 
Robust p-values are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% levels respectively. Definition of variables are specified in the Appendix. 
 Dependent variables   
 RET CAR 
  (1) (2) 
TREAT 0.239*** -0.0158 
 (0.00747) (0.609) 
POST0 0.462*** 0.128*** 
 (0) (0) 
POST1 0.886*** 0.318*** 
 (0) (0) 
POST2 1.354*** 0.553*** 
 (0) (0) 
TREAT × POST0 0.100 0.0526** 
 (0.159) (0.0363) 
TREAT × POST1 0.167** 0.0810** 
 (0.0385) (0.0291) 
TREAT × POST2 0.148** 0.0703* 
 (0.0166) (0.0911) 
Constant 0.0148 0.0257 
 (0.580) (0.256) 
 
Observations 479,904 479,904 
R-squared 0.362 0.280 
sample period 2003-2014 2003-2014 
cluster se province province 
Firm FE Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes 
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Table 5  
Effects of political promotion on change of institutional ownership given different state-
own share percentage 
This table shows the regression results of political promotion events on annual changes of 
institutional ownership in two subsamples with different state-own share percentage. A firm is 
classifiedas high state-own share percentage if the central of local government holds more than 
20% of the total shares in issue. Robust p-values are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. Definition of variables are specified in 
the Appendix. 
 Dependent variable: ΔMF_HOLD 
  (1) (2) 
TREAT -0.434 -0.0571 
 (0.128) (0.920) 
PRE2 -0.121 -0.140 
 (0.494) (0.483) 
PRE1 -0.524*** -0.0932 
 (0.000706) (0.396) 
POST0 -0.0779 -0.0848 
 (0.519) (0.634) 
POST1 0.00818 -0.0658 
 (0.926) (0.715) 
TREAT × PRE2 0.457 0.495 
 (0.448) (0.564) 
TREAT × PRE1 1.827*** 0.344 
 (0.000294) (0.506) 
TREAT × POST0 0.422 0.381 
 (0.348) (0.638) 
TREAT × POST1 0.0733 0.282 
 (0.830) (0.725) 
ΔMB 2.424*** 3.486*** 
 (6.04e-11) (8.76e-08) 
ΔLEV 0.383 1.285 
 (0.865) (0.814) 
ΔSIZE 4.936*** 7.107*** 
 (1.04e-07) (0.000390) 
ΔROA 5.400* 27.51*** 
 (0.0648) (0.000685) 
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Table 5(continued）   
ΔCR 0.0370 0.138 
 (0.842) (0.642) 
ΔAR -5.466* -11.68 
 (0.0841) (0.115) 
ΔINV -3.482 -1.437 
 (0.122) (0.806) 
ΔGDP 0.852** 0.0400 
 (0.0425) (0.952) 
Constant -6.366*** -1.761 
 (0.00751) (0.591) 
Observations 26,755 12,657 
R-squared 0.235 0.264 
sample period 2003-2014 2003-2014 
cluster se province province 
Firm FE Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes 
State-own share percentage low high 
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